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The existence of a goal conflict in the buyer/seller re-
lationship is inherent under a profit motivated system where
conventional procurement techniques are used. The buyer
seeks maximum performance at minimum life cycle cost and the
seller seeks to maximize profit which may translate to mini-
mizing reliability improvement costs. Experience of military
and commercial procurement activities with the use of Relia-
bility Improvement Warranties (RIW's) has led to the conclu-
sion that the RIW may be a valuable tool in bringing buyer/
seller goals into agreement by transferring the management of
costs to the seller. Background material on DoD and commer-
cial warranty experience is used to form the framework for
an evaluation criteria developed by ARINC Research Corpora-
tion to test the applicability of RIW to a particular acqui-
sition. The limited DoD guidance which has been promulgated
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Contractor motivation in the procurement process has
been historically perceived as profit oriented. Consequently,
most contract incentives have been linked to profit as an
inducement for the contractor to seek the objectives estab-
lished by the buyer. Recent analysis of contractors partici-
pating in DoD procurements has resulted in the conclusion
that profit alone may not be the dominant objective of most
contractors [Ref. 1] . Maximization of such factors as cash
flow, sales, market share, or return on investment, may be
viewed as more realistic objectives. In addition to these
financially oriented goals, the contractor may seek a long
term relationship with the buyer which could involve short
term financial losses or minimum profit. With the buyer's
goal being maximum performance at minimum life cycle cost
and the seller pursuing a goal which does not consider all
of the costs to be born by the buyer, rather, only the pro-
duction cost; there exists a goal conflict in the buyer/
seller relationship.
Motivation of the contractor toward the objectives of
the buyer has been the purpose of incentive contracts which
are in wide use today; however, if these contracts are in-
centivizing the wrong factors the conflict will remain unre-
solved. Rather than analyzing each contract situation
(assuming objectives change from one contract to another for

any one contractor) to determine what factors to incentivize,
it is infinitely more productive to create a contract where
the seller may pursue his own goals in arriving at comple-
tion; but, at the same time he will maximize the objective
set out in the buyer's requirement. A mechanism for achiev-
ing both buyer and seller goals in the procurement process
may be the use of a Failure Free Warranty (FFW) or as it has
more recently been called, a Reliability Improvement Warranty
(RIW). This thesis will attempt to answer the questions of
whether RIW is a viable means of resolving the goal conflict
of buyers and sellers and to what extent it is applicable to
DoD procurements.
Answering the above questions will require analysis of
contractor performance when using a Reliability Improvement
Warranty contract. Determination of RIW procurement viabil-
ity will be possible after performing an analysis of assumed
contractor behavior. Applicability of RIW to DoD procure-
ments will be discussed both from the historical perspective
as well as through analysis of contractor behavior when per-




A. PURPOSE OF WARRANTIES
In defining the terms to be used in this discussion ex-
tensive coverage must be given to the word "warranty." The
purpose of a warranty is to protect the buyer from unidenti-
fiable defects in the supplies or services provided by the
seller and to limit the liability of the seller. The war-
ranty is then the legal link between buyer and seller after
the contract is completed or perhaps even while the contract
is in progress. In order to provide protection to buyers of
goods and services, uniform legal provisions have been en-
acted by all the states. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
which replaced the Uniform Sales Act of 1906 is now recog-
nized as the basis for transacting any public or private
contract. Since there is no Federal Law that conflicts with
the UCC, the Government has felt free to adopt these codes
as the guide for Government contracts. In an Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decision in 1964, the
Board stated that the UCC has been adopted by 28 states (now,
all states) and that the UCC reflects the best in modern de-
cision and discussion. Two types of warranties exist based
on the UCC to provide buyer protection.

B. TYPES OF WARRANTIES
The first type of warranty is implied in that the seller
is providing merchantable goods which are to be used for a
purpose known to both buyer and seller. UCC states that:
"Where the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modi-
fied under the next section, an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose."
[Ref. 2, p. 86]
The UCC also provides remedies to the buyer in the event of
a breach of an implied warranty which closely resembles the
actions available to the government under the fixed price
supply inspection clause. These actions include recovery of
excess purchase costs and reimbursement for incidental and
consequential charges.
In government procurements the existence of an implied
warranty depends on the type of contract. In cost-reimburse
ment contracts, the implied warranty does not apply. Fixed-
price construction contracts may take advantage of implied
warranties, but in fixed-price contracts for supplies and
services the inspection clause is a conclusive acceptance
and it invalidates any implied warranty [Ref. 3, p. 8715]
The second type of warranty is an express warranty which
may be conveyed by affirmation of fact, description of the
goods to be bought, or conformance of delivered material to




"It is not necessary to the creation of an express
warranty that the seller use formal words such as
'warranty' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement pur-
porting to be merely the seller's opinion or commen-
dation of the goods does not create a warranty"
[Ref. 2, pp. 79-80]
C. ASPR DEFINITIONS
Although the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR) do not define an express warranty, ASPR 1-324 does
state that a warranty does provide the government with the
contractual right to assert claims regarding the deficiency
of supplies or services. The decision to use a warranty is
reserved for the Chief of the Purchasing Office emphasizing
the fact that warranties must be used only if economically
feasible and administratively practical. Of specific concern
to the present discussion of RIW application in DoD procure-
ments is the list of factors in Appendix A which must be
considered in deciding whether to use a warranty clause.
ASPR defines five types of express warranties. They
are
:
Supply warranty - requires the contractor to replace or
reperform work on contract items found to be defective
at the time of acceptance.
Correction of Deficiency V/arranty - requires the con-
tractor to correct design, material or workmanship defi-
ciency which is found to exist during test and evaluation




Service Warranty - specifies a time period during which
the contractor agrees to reperform defective services,
providing defects in workmanship existed at the time of
acceptance and are discovered during the period.
Construction warranty - requires the contractor to remedy,
at his own expense, any nonconformance of work to the
contract specifications and any defect in design, materi-
al or workmanship.
Reliability Improvement Warranty - places complete respon-
sibility on the contractor for repair of defects for a
specified period of time or a measured amount of opera-
tion and may require demonstration of performance improve-
ment over the life of the contract.
It is the last of these warranty categories which will receive
further investigation as to its applications and limitations.
D. VARIATIONS OF RIW
Variations of the RIW exist which may incorporate any
number of areas relating to the performance of the equipment
purchased. These areas include (a) Mean Time Between Fail-
ure (MTBF), (b) Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), (c) False Removal
Rate (FRR), (d) Direct Maintenance Manhours (DMMH), (e)
Elapsed Maintenance Time (EMT), (f) Beyond Capability of
Maintenance (BCM) Rate, (g) Not Operationally Ready Supply
(NORS) Rate, (h) Availability, and (j) Turn-around Time (TAT).
Although the practicality and cost of administration of
these types may vary, it is possible to construct a contract
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which will affect contractor consideration of any one or all
of these characteristics and be based on demonstrated per-
formance in the warranty area.
E. ACHIEVEMENT OF SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
As a baseline for entry into any procurement the buyer
must have in mind some measure of effectiveness against
which to judge the hardware which is delivered. In subsystem
and component acquisitions this measure of effectiveness has
generally been reliability expressed as mean time between
failure (MTBF). Rarely has there been an effort made to take
a systems approach to the acquisition process and as a conse-
quence the specification of reliability for subsystems and
components has not been a cost effective process. The inter-
dependence of subsystems mandates the need for an integrated
systems approach to the specification of reliability. Opti-
mization of subsystem cost and reliability parameters would
provide the desired level of probability of completing the
mission at minimum cost. The Air Force Systems Command has
shown that it is possible to determine optimum levels of sub-
system reliability for a major weapon system even though
cost data may not be refined to point estimates [Ref. 4].
It is essential that consideration be given to the level
of reliability desired for each subsystem regardless of the
procurement technique to be employed. Figure la illustrates
this point qualitatively for the relationship of reliability
versus the research, development and production cost to be




Figure la Cost of Reliability Improvement
*
RTTBF
Figure lb System Operation and Maintenance Cost
$
MTBF
Figure Ic System Life Cycle Support Cost




vertical width of the curve at any given point represents
the uncertainty associated with achieving that level of re-
liability. The life cycle cost considerations for a subsys-
tem, however, also include the operation and maintenance
(O&M) cost of the item and these O&M costs are depicted in
Figure lb in relation to MTBF. Total life cycle support
costs are derived by adding the two previous curves as repre-
sented by Figure lc. The development of the relationship of
subsystem life cycle support costs to achieve various levels
of reliability and the relationship of subsystem reliability
to the probability of the system completing its mission will
provide the basis for cost effectiveness trade-offs in the
design and evolution of the system. Although a systems ap-
proach to system reliability requirements is not mandatory
for any one particular procurement technique, it is easy to
see the possible consequences in increased costs of over-
specifying subsystem reliability.
One additional comment should be made at this point con-
cerning requirements for reliability. In the discussion to
follow concerning commercial airline practices and experi-
ences with warranties the concept of form, fit and function
specifications is brought forward. Basically, this concept
considers the area between input and output of a component
or system to be the concern of the manufacturer and not the
buyer. The airlines give to competitive suppliers a set of
characteristics which describe the form of the component,
i.e. visible panel requirements, connector and receptacle
15

locations. The fit characteristics describe location and
dimensions, and the function characteristics define all
mechanical, electrical, and visual inputs or outputs. The
use of this type of requirement in military procurements
appears to have merit and is under study in a procurement
presently in progress which will be discussed later.
F. SELLER MOTIVATION
A qualitative comparison of warranty and non-warranty
procurement techniques may be undertaken after establishing
with some degree of confidence the shape of the curves in
Figures la and lb. The standard procurement approach recog-
nizes the importance that the frequency of equipment failure
and the expense involved in equipment repair are prime de-
terminants of support costs. Therefore, a specified minimum
level of reliability based on the relationship between sup-
port cost and reliability is demanded in the contract. In-
corporation of a RIW with an MTBF guarantee in the procurement
forces the contractor to view the outcome of his effort in a
slightly different light.
The buyer believes that in a standard procurement relia-
bility is controlled by the specification of a minimum ac-
ceptable level. In fact, however, it is the contractor who
controls the reliability that is built into the equipment.
Demonstrated reliability will depend largely upon how sharply
the contractor concentrates on it during design, development,
and production. If the contractor's basic motivation is one









Figure 2 EFFECT OF RELIABILITY ON INITIAL COST
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The general relationship between initial equipment cost
(research, development, and production) and reliability pro-
duces an area of profit identified by the shaded segment.
No particular significance need be associated with the pre-
cise shape of the curve, but it does indicate increasing
cost associated with higher reliability. With an agreed
upon contract price the supplier will seek to maximize the
difference between price and cost.
While the minimum acceptable reliability places a limi-
tation on how far down the curve the contractor may go, in
practice tests to demonstrate achievement of the required
level are not yet as unequivocal as tests of other equipment
parameters, such as, power output. Reliability demonstra-
tion is also time consuming and expensive and there can be
considerable debate about the number of failures experienced.
Additionally the criteria for what constitutes a failure may
be difficult to establish. Two basic problems face the
buyer using conventional procurement techniques. First, the
contractor, who alone can raise the levels of equipment
characteristics that are basic determinants of support costs,
is economically motivated to lower them. Second, the lack
of def initiveness of the demonstration test creates uncer-
tainty about the actual achievement
.
Incorporation of a RIW with MTBF guarantee in the produc-
tion contract requires the same analysis as a conventional
procurement to arrive at a minimum acceptable level of reli-
ability. In this contract the supplier is asked to quote a
18

price for the desired equipment and a price for which all
repairs will be made for the duration of the contract. In
formulating the equipment design and proposal the contractor
views reliability and support costs in a new light. Over-
estimation of the expected reliability will affect the sup-
plier's cost of repair in the fixed price environment of the
contract. Provided the award is competitive the potential
suppliers will be disinclined to underestimate the achievable
reliability in order to improve profit since that action may
result in loss of the contract.
The management of the life cycle costs in a RIW contract
is transferred to the supplier. The supplier's cost/relia-
bility curve takes the shape of Figure 3 and trade-offs can
be made at the supplier's discretion. It should be noted
that the shape of the supplier's cost curve is, in essence,
the same as that previously perceived by the buyer and that
the buyer's cost is represented by a straight line fixed at
the price of the contract. As in the conventional procure-
ment technique it is reasonable to assume that the contractor
will seek to maximize profit and move toward the minimum on
the curve. During equipment design the contractor can in-
troduce changes which, while resulting in higher initial
cost, will be more than compensated for in reduced support
costs. In addition, the contractor's concern with reliabil-
ity improvement does not end with the production phase. Any
subsequent modifications that will move total costs to a














The warranty provision thus places responsibility for all
costs on the supplier and allows the freedom for the supplier




Aside from the mechanics of supplier motivation and buyer
decision-making on reliability requirements, there are re-
strictions on the use of RIW which may rule out its applica-
bility from the outset. Since the supplier is accepting all
of the cost risk in a firm-fixed price RIW contract there
must exist a reasonable amount of certainty about the shape
of the failure-rate curve of the warranted equipment. The
supplier will be able to predict plant loading requirements
for repair of the equipment based on the shape of the fail-
ure-rate curve.
Some empirical evidence exists for electronic and elec-
tromechanical devices which suggests a "bathtub" shaped
failure-rate curve as illustrated in Figure 4. Electronic
and electromechanical devices lend themselves to warranty
application because of the constant failure-rate exhibited
after initial burn-in during the infant mortality period.
Equipments which do not exhibit wearout characteristics can
be said to have a constant failure-rate. As a consequence,
any equipment which is as good after some period of use as
it was when it was new can be categorized as a candidate for
RIW procurement. As an example of an item which demonstrates
wearout characteristics consider an automobile or aircraft
tire. Each increment of use which is obtained from the tire
increases the chance of failure. It is reasonable to assume


































involved in supporting an equipment which has an increasing
failure-rate curve and therefore it is essential for the
protection of the contractor that an MTBF guarantee which
extends into the wearout phase of the equipment failure-rate
curve not be included in the RIW contract. The degree of
uncertainty about the shape of the failure-rate curve will
affect the supplier's analysis of the cost risk and penalties
of the contract.
The contractor performing under a RIW demands that organ-
izational maintenance be limited to a functional check and
test capability and preventive maintenance requirements. In
some instances the supplier has trained and certified buyer
personnel to perform limited repair. Adequacy of preserva-
tion and packing facilities at the organizational level must
be verified to ensure proper handling of defective components
for return to the contractor's facilities. Protection of
the contractor against buyer induced damage or "murder"
losses must be incorporated into the contract so that the
supplier is not liable for those losses.
The buyer is forced to relinquish configuration control
of the equipment supported by RIW, but the supplier must
maintain form, fit, and function. The essence of the con-
tractor's benefits from a RIW agreement resides in the con-
trol of the design of the equipment within form, fit, and
function guidelines. How the supplier redesigns and re-
engineers the equipment determines what improvements will be
demonstrated in reliability and as a consequence what the
24

supplier's repair costs will be. Redesign can also reduce
the supplier's cost of repair by optimizing materials used
in repair and labor requirements to affect those repairs.
In order to stimulate contractor interest in making per-
formance/cost trade-offs the warranty should be of sufficient
duration to permit the recovery of the contractor's invest-
ment in product improvement. The contractor can be expected
to make an investment in reliability improvement if the
probability of avoidance of future repair costs is suffi-
ciently high to warrant the investment. Allowing the con-
tractor to manage the design and make trade-offs on his own
eliminates most of the delay normally encountered in the ap-
proval and implementation of an engineering change generated
within DoB.
The cash flow realized under a RIW contract has some
bearing on the decision-making process by the supplier. The
conventional procedure for payment for a RIW contract has
been on an annual percentage basis over the life of the con-
tract. A representative cash flow on a five year RIW con-
tract, as viewed by the supplier, is illustrated in Figure
5. Assuming that the component or system is a technical ad-
vancement of an existing equipment there will be some product
development cost on the minus side of the cash flow graph.
The plus side of the graph is essentially fixed by the na-
ture of the contract, i.e. firm-fixed price, and thus the
contractor must make trade-offs between production, relia-
















relationship between reliability improvement investment by
the contractor and the expected reduction in cost of repair
that can be realized from it. In the early stages of the
contract the supplier will be more willing to invest capital
in improvements to the product. The decision process which
takes place can be compared to a standard investment decision
with the exception that the contractor knows in advance the
market value of whatever decision that is made. The unknown
quantity in the calculation that is performed is the cost
avoided in repair of the warranted components.
The decreasing likelihood that the contractor will invest
capital in a modification which could improve reliability as
the contract progresses and the near certainty that improve-
ments will not be made which are not cost effective to the
contractor are two weaknesses in the RIW concept. There are
provisions available which can strengthen these observed
weaknesses. Improvements which are not cost effective for
the contractor to include in the equipment can be offered to
the buyer at anytime during the contract in the form of Value
Engineering proposals. The buyer's evaluation of these pro-
posals will determine the cost benefits to be derived and
the value of incorporation in the equipment. This does not
suggest that the contractor will have a mechanism for avoid-
ing liability provided the RIW includes an MTBF guarantee
which must be met by the supplier.
Buyer restrictions on the use of warranties stem from
the buyer's concern with life cycle costs. In analyzing a
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proposal for use of RIW the costs avoided from conventional
in-house support are relevant. However, the refinement of
cost data within the life cycle categories of development,
production, and operation proves to be a difficult task.
Where the analysis is being performed on equipment presently
supported by in-house means, parallel programs of warranty
and nonwarranty can be carried on and the data thus collected
can be compared. The Lear Siegler AJB-3A two-gyro-stability
platform is an example of this type of analysis conducted by
the Aviation Supply Office of the Navy.
In the case of a new component being introduced as a sub-
system of some larger weapon system, a parallel analysis is
not possible and reliance on some form of modeling may be
substituted. The development of life cycle cost models has
been documented in References 5 and 6 but in each case the
requirements for data limit the value of the model. The
conclusions derived from the models can only be accepted to
the extent that the cost data is accurate. Data collection
systems are currently in operation which will bring visibil-
ity to specific cost categories necessary to make decisions
about the use of warranties (Navy 3M System and Air Force
AFM-66-1 System). In the interim, a means must be made
available to the buyer to make decisions about the cost ef-
fectiveness of warranty use. This interim procedure in the
case of DoD procurements must take into account the require-
ments of DoD Directive 4100.35 which emphasizes the impor-
tance of considering, estimating, and evaluating the life
28

cycle cost implications of an acquisition. The problem of
establishing a fair price for contractor warranty exposure
is resolved by the pressures of competition when it is pres-
ent and the contractor receiving the award is free to make
investments in reliability improvement as necessary to maxi-
mize profit or minimize losses. When competition does not
exist reliance on a life cycle cost curve such as Figure lc
must be evaluated. A worst case analysis in this instance
will evaluate the lower bound of the cost curve against the
contractor proposal of cost and reliability. If the con-
tractor proposal is below the lower bound of the cost curve
the decision to use RIW is valid. If the proposal is above
the upper bound RIW should not be considered. The cases in
which the sole source proposal falls within the band cf un-
certainty concerning costs, a qualitative evaluation must be
made of the incommensurable factors.
Some relevant data has come out of the RIW programs and
other cost studies to date in DoD. For example, it is esti-
mated that a RIW contract increases the annual cost to the
buyer by 6% to 9% of the unit production price. Experience
on inertial navigation equipments in DoD indicates that 83%
to 92% of the maintenance cost of these systems is incurred
at depot repair facilities and that the annual direct cost
at the depot is 13% to 18% of the system acquisition cost.
The investment cost in maintenance handbooks, intermediate
level test equipment, and intermediate and depot level spare
parts and sub-assemblies plus maintenance training for one
29

year for the AWG-10 missile control system has been established
at approximately 22% of the acquisition cost of the 430 unit
AWG-10 inventory. The direct ten-year ownership cost for
all avionics equipments has been estimated at 3.4 to 4.3
times the equipment cost. That value placed on the cost of
ownership is exclusive of all indirect costs which are diffi-
cult to accumulate [Ref. 7]. The economic value of a RIW
can be explained in terms of costs avoided but the magnitude
of those costs can only be estimated in most instances. The
development of cost estimating relationships (CER's) for
such categories as development, production, publications,
training, modification, and maintenance has allowed some
preliminary evaluation of shipboard installations [Ref. 8].
Further work must be done in the development of meaningful
CER's in order to make economic evaluation of RIW's a more
exact science. Where cost data is extremely uncertain pro-
tection of buyer and seller interests may only be achieved
by postponing the decision on procurement technique until





A. LEAR SIEGLER GYRO
The first attempt to utilize an express warranty of the
RIW type in DoD procurement was for the MD-1 vertical gyro-
scope used extensively by the Air Force in the 1960's. Based
on the Air Force's concern with real costs in procurement
over the life of an equipment, the Instrument Division of
Lear Siegler (LSI) submitted an unsolicited proposal for a
Failure Free Warranty of the gyro in 1964 which would incor-
porate guaranteed operational performance, turn-around time,
and reliability improvement. The warranty called for repair
or replacement of any warranted gyro for a period of five
years or 5,000 hours of operation, whichever comes sooner
[Ref. 9, p. 24].
The Air Force refused the proposal and it was not until
1968 that the Navy entered into the first military RIW con-
tract. This contract was again with Lear Siegler and it was
for repair of the AJB-3 gyro used in the A-4 and F-4 air-
craft. Prior to the award to LSI the Navy was experiencing
maintenance-overhaul costs of $3.44 per operating hour and
an operational MTBF of 400 hours. At the end of the five
year contract the cost of repair was reduced to $2.08 per
hour and the MTBF was improved to 531 hours [Ref. 10, p. 40].
Lear Siegler has a similar contract with the Air Force for
gyros used in the F-lll aircraft. In this case, a 3000 hour
or five year warranty is in effect. The unit production
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cost is $6040 and the warranty cost is $2200 which represents
about a 7% annual cost for repair. The current MTBF is 1214
hours, as compared with an estimated 749 hour MTBF for a
competing unit not under warranty [Ref. 11, p. 623].
B. OTHER DOD EXAMPLES
Further examples of the use of Reliability Improvement
Warranties in the acquisition of Government Furnished Equip-
ment and spares have been documented in References 12 and 13.
Until recently, however, there has been no attempt to extend
the application of RIW to an entire system. The Naval Elec-
tronics System Command is presently pursuing the development
of a new electronics warfare suite for shipboard installa-
tion, and the support of the deployed system may be on a RIW
basis. The Air Force ARN-XXX TACAN program is nearing pro-
duction award and the competitors for this contract have
been aware of the RIW option throughout development. The
warranty package to be included in this contract is quite
extensive and will be discussed in a later section.
The requirements of all RIW's to date in DoD have in-
cluded provisions for a smooth transition of the equipment
from contractor support to the buyer's organic support sys-
tem. These provisions include special tooling, technical
data, training, field support and data accumulation and re-
porting. In most instances the supplier has delivered
these items as not separately priced either during the per-
formance of the contract or at termination. The degree of
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data collection and reporting has generally been extensive
not only for the buyer's benefit, but because the supplier
uses the data during contract performance to make decisions
concerning failure analysis of the entire population of
equipments or on individual equipments by serial number. In
some instances intermediate or depot level test equipment
has been delivered. The transition of a proven design with
all equipments in one configuration along with documentation
on spare parts provisioning requirements is viewed as a fac-
tor militating in favor of the RIW concept.
C. AIRLINE INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE
A study of the experience the airline industry has had
with RIW provides some historical perspective to the forth-
coming discussion of DoD procurement and RIW. Standards for
electronic equipment and systems and powerplant equipment
have allowed the industry to specify form-fit-function types
of requirements to be satisfied by suppliers. These stand-
ards (known as ARINC Characteristics) define the electrical,
mechanical, and environmental interfaces to be encountered
by a component and leave the design of it up to the suppliers
[Ref. 14, p. 7]. Standardization of the task to be accom-
plished by a component throughout the industry allows equip-
ment manufacturers to compete on an equal basis so long as
the equipment is certified by the FAA. The unique feature
of this type of specification is that details of construc-
tion, cost, or reliability are never explicitly spelled out.
The competitive market place is relied upon to determine
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these factors. If insufficient competition is present to
ensure a reasonable minimum reliability will be achieved, an
MTBF guarantee is included.
A sharp contrast in the operating environments of com-
mercial and military aviation should be noted, but in the
comparative studies done to date, the airlines have achieved
higher MTBF rates for similar equipment which are also in
military use [Ref. 15]. The extensive use of warranties by
the airlines in procurement of avionics and engines exerts a
positive influence on initial reliability achievements and
on reliability growth. The range of annual cost of warran-
ties for commercial airlines has been 4% to 10% of the unit
acquisition cost.
The airline industry has established four basic types of
warranties which are set forth in the World Airline Suppli-
ers' Guide . The first type is a standard or failure free
warranty which provides repair or replacement at supplier
expense for a specified number of operating hours or calen-
dar time. The second type is an ultimate life warranty
which is applied to major structural components and extends
beyond the limits of the two or three year failure free war-
ranty but claims are usually adjusted on a pro-rated basis.
Reliability guarantees are established to provide minimum
MTBF rates and if not achieved, the supplier provides addi-
tional spare parts support or no cost modifications to the
equipment to achieve the stated MTBF. The fourth type of
warranty is a maximum parts cost guarantee which is used to
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establish a maximum materials cost per flying hour for main-
taining, modifying, repairing, and overhauling an equipment.
Categories of equipments placed under this type of warranty
include tires and brakes and the guarantee periods typically
are ten years in duration. The standard or failure free
warranty is most universal, although all four types are em-
ployed. Current practice is to include MTBF guarantees as
well, although there is a trend towards replacing this with
a MTBUR (mean time between unscheduled removal) guarantee.
The major provisions of an airline warranty were presented
by George Hiller of Pan American World Airways as follows:
[Ref. 10, Section E]
(1) Establish a calendar time period and maximum
operating hour limit for the component or system.
(2) Determine the responsibility for transporta-
tion costs of failed and repaired assemblies.
(3) Establish provisions for repair by the user
and how these repairs will affect contractor payment.
(4) Set an equipment turnaround time and the penal-
ties to be paid by the supplier.
(5) Establish MTBF guarantee.
(6) Define preventive maintenance requirements to
be accomplished by the user.
(7) Provide for a maintenance cost guarantee which
must be met by the supplier.
(8) Establish the requirements for manual, publi-
cations, and technical assistance.
(9) Establish equipment availability requirement
and what steps the supplier must take to guarantee it.
Many of these provisions employed by the airlines have
been incorporated in the application and evaluation criteria
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to be discussed in the next section. Comments on the sig-




V. EXISTING APPLICATION CRITERIA
The technique suggested here may be used as a guideline
for the buyer to be alert to the fact that consideration of
warranty use is in order. The sequence of questions that
the buyer must answer should lead to a preliminary decision
of whether or not to explore the possibility of using RIW
with prospective suppliers. The starting point for this
analysis technique presupposes that a firm grasp of the MTBF
requirement is at hand.
A. ARINC CRITERIA
The criteria developed by ARINC Research Corporation
(see Appendix B) for the Rome Air Development Center is dis-
cussed in Reference 17 and was presented at the Joint Logis-
tic Commanders Electronic System Reliability Workshop in
January 1975. Some of the factors in the criteria are con-
sidered more important than others and therefore they are
ranked according to the following classes:
1. Major: failure to meet the stated criterion could
be grounds for not using warranty.
2. Secondary: failure to meet the stated criterion
will generally not be sufficient basis for rejecting
warranty but a combination of such events could be.
3. Minor: failure to meet these criterion is generally
not considered serious but may require special consider-
ations in structuring the warranty contract or adminis-
trative procedures.
Three broad areas of consideration have been found in the
criteria. They are: procurement factors, equipment
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characteristics, and application factors. Each area is con-
sidered equally important with respect to accepting or re-
jecting the use of warranty.
It is important to note that the warranty selection
criteria presented should be used as a qualitative instrument
for the measurement of systems as potential candidates for
RIW usage. The decision to include a warranty clause in a
procurement contract should not be made lightly since a prop-
er approach involves a great deal of effort in structuring
effective procurement, administrative and logistic provisions
The effort in preparing a response to the invitation for bids
can be a costly exercise by the contractor and should not be
imposed without a reasonable certainty that RIW will be em-
ployed.
An economic analysis of the potential of warranty support
cannot be made until warranty price and implementation pro-
posals are received from the bidding contractor. Exercise
of a warranty life cycle model such as the one described in
References 17 and 18 can provide a quantitative assessment
of the warranty alternatives. Although data element re-
quirements for this and similar models cannot be defined as
point estimates, a range of values for speculative costs can




Direction from DoD in the use of RIW has come recently
from the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (In-
stallations and Logistics) and the Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering. Interest in RIW at the OSD level
has prompted the initiation of test programs to determine
whether potential economic reliability benefits do, in fact,
result from the use of RIW. The Services have been requested
to undertake trial use of RIW's in a number of electronic
system/equipment programs. The focal point of these trial
programs will be in the Office of the Assistant Secretary
(I&L) with Donald F. Spencer who is the chairman of the Re-
liability Improvement Warranty Committee [Ref. 19, p. A-14].
The guidelines set forth in the joint memorandum issued
by ASD (I&L) and DDR&E are similar to those published by the
Air Force in July 1974 in its Interim Guidelines Reliability
Improvement Warranty (RIW)
. The application criteria estab-
lished by both of these documents stress the importance of
making the decision to use RIW as early as possible in the
system life cycle, so that prospective contractors may make
design trade-offs. The following criteria is presented from
the Air Force interim guidelines and significant agreement
can be seen with the criteria offered by ARINC previously.
1. A warranty can be obtained at a price commensurate
with the contemplated value of the warranty work to be
accomplished with consideration being given to the con-
tractually specified R&M requirements.
2. Moderate to high initial support costs are involved.
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3. The equipment is readily transportable to permit
return to the vendor's plant or, alternatively, the
equipment is one for which a contractor can provide
field service.
4. The equipment is generally self-contained, is gen-
erally immune from failures induced by outside units,
and has readily identifiable failure characteristics.
5. The equipment application in terms of expected oper-
ating time and the use of environment are known.
6. The equipment is susceptible to being contracted
for on a fixed price basis, with competition on the
basis for form, fit and function stimulated to the ex-
tent practicable.
7. The contract can be structured to provide a warranty
period of from 3-5 years. This should allow the con-
tractor sufficient time to identify and analyze failures
in order to permit reliability and maintainability im-
provements.
8. The equipment has a potential for both reliability
growth and reduction in repair costs.
9. Potential contractors indicate a cooperative atti-
tude toward acceptance of a RIW provision and evaluation
of its effectiveness.
10. A sufficient quantity of the equipment is to be
procured to make the RIW cost effective.
11. The equipment is of a configuration that discourages
unauthorized field repair, preferably sealed and capable
of containing an Elapsed Time Indicator (ETI) or some
other means of usage indication.
12. There is a reasonable degree of assurance that there
will be a high utilization of the equipment.
13. The equipment is one that permits the contractor
to effect no-cost ECPs subsequent to the Government's
approval
.
14. Failure data and the intended operational use data
can be furnished the contractor for the proposed con-
tractual period and updated periodically during the
term of the contract.
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The question of funding is addressed by OSD as follows:
In the past, different points of view have been expressed
regarding the funding of RIWs. Lack of clear guidance in
this area has caused difficulties in the use of this con-
tractual technique. In order to provide clarification re-
garding the types of funds to be used for procurements
incorporating RIW, the funding policy guidelines have been
authorized for use by OASD (Comptroller) and Office of As-
sistant General Counsel (Financial Management). These fund-
ing guidelines should permit the more effective utilization
of RIWs.
1. RIWs shall be funded from the same appropriation as
the acquisition or overhead warranted (i.e., the war-
ranty shall be paid from the procurement, operation and
maintenance, or RDT&E appropriation of the service or
agency concerned depending on from which of the said
appropriations the acquisition or overhaul is funded).
The RIW cost is part of the fixed contract price, and
payment to the warrantor for the RIW portion shall not
be made in a manner different than payment under the
remaining portion of the contract, except that, payment
for the RIW may be delayed until delivery or relinquish-
ment of control of the item by the warrantor.
2. In order to maintain the important distinction be-
tween a RIW and a service contract covering normal,
periodic maintenance, the following requirements must
be satisfied:
A. The RIW shall be included in a fixed price con-
tract for the acquisition or overhaul of an item or
items.
B. The warranty period on each item shall begin
after manufacture or overhaul, upon delivery or
relinquishment of control of the item by the war-
rantor.
C. The RIW shall require the warrantor to repair
or replace the warranted item upon failure.
D. The RIW shall not include requirements for the
warrantor to provide normal upkeep, cleaning, ad-
justing, regulating or other periodic maintenance
which would be required without respect to failure.
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E. The RIW shall exclude components of the war-
ranted item which under normal circumstances will
require replacement before the expiration of the
warranty (such as filters, lightbulbs, etc.).
Such items may be provided for by separate provi-
sions of the contract consistent with current laws
and regulations, but they shall not be included in
the RIW provision.
Although it is not possible to write one RIW clause for
inclusion in a contract which is to use this warranty provi-
sion, there are some essential elements which normally should
be considered. In the statement of the contractor warranty
the following elements should be explicitly detailed:
1. State the duration that the warranty will be in
effect, expressed in operating hours/cycles and calen-
dar time.
2. State the primary objective of the warranty which
normally will express a desire to motivate the contrac-
tor to design and produce equipment which is more reli-
able and less costly to repair than <xt present. If a
guaranteed MTBF is required it should be clearly set
forth.
3. State what constitutes a failure which will require
the contractor to repair or replace the failed item.
4. State what conditions and actions associated with
repairs are specifically excluded under the warranty.
5. State the requirements for paying shipping costs
of failed units to and from the contractor's facility.
6. Indicate a separate price for the warranty coverage
and for the basic unit procured in order to make it
possible to determine the cost of the RIW.
Contractor obligations in performance of the RIW con-
tract should also be expressed and include the following:
1. Require the contractor to mark all warranted items
with the information necessary to make the item recog-
nizable as a warranted part, the warranty period and




2. State the required turnaround time and contractual
adjustments or other considerations to be expected if
the contractor exceeds the TAT.
3. State the data requirements, both details to be
reported and frequency.
Additional elements to be included in the RIW clase include
the following items:
1. Indicate which party is to provide shipping con-
tainers if required.
2. State procedures for submittal of contractor ini-
tiated no-cost ECP's.
3. State the extent of inspection of failed and/or
repaired units by both parties.
4. Indicate disposition procedures to be followed for
units beyond economical repair and the disposition of
the unused portion of the warranty for any unit sub-
jected to an excluded failure or that is declared lost.
5. Indicate the requirement for both parties to notify
each other, within a specified time, of any deficiency
discovered in a unit.
6. State whether or not the contractor will be com-
pensated for the cost of testing items for which no
discrepancy is found.
7. Indicate the circumstances, if any, under which
the buyer is authorized to make adjustments to units
under warranty.
8. State the data requirements to be provided by the
buyer on operation and maintenance of the system.
The extensive list of restrictions on the use of RIW may
at first appear to all but eliminate the use of this mecha-
nism in the acquisition process. The extent of the guidance
provided is not meant to prohibit the use of RIW but rather
is presented to make visible the possible pitfalls which
could occur. There are some considerations to be made out-
side the application criteria and guidance offered by DoD
which lend a touch of reality to the RIW concept.
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First, the problem of sophistication of present weapon
systems adds an increased burden of retention of qualified
technical personnel. In an environment which has histori-
cally not been conducive to career technicians the need for
simplified modular replacement of failed assemblies which
have built-in test equipment is great. With personnel costs
rising rapidly in the face of a shrinking defense budget
there is an urgent need to reduce the estimated 27% of the
Armed Services presently engaged in maintenance functions.
Second, the cost certainty provided by the RIW should be
given some weight in the decision of whether to use it.
Present economic uncertainties have caused many programs to
suffer greatly at the hands of inflation even prior to reach-
ing the stage of budgetary analysis. The rearrangement and
smoothing effect of the buyer's cost flow can be considered
another point in favor of the RIW.
Third, the awareness by qualified suppliers that a
stable long-term relationship is established with the buyer
in a RIW contract will make competition keen. Those sup-
pliers having RIW contracts at present speak highly of the
concept for at least two reasons. There is freedom to make
decisions about the equipment design and limited outside in-
fluence on the contractor's operation. But uppermost in the
contractor's mind is the thought that there is freedom to




Fourth, the incorporation of RIW in a contract does not
preclude gaming on the part of the supplier. For example,
if the average operating period of the equipment under RIW
is a sufficiently large multiple of the guaranteed MTBF, it
could be possible for an enterprising supplier to put a
small quantity of very reliable components into service and
thereby skew the distribution of failures while maintaining
the desired mean. To guard against this possibility it is
conceivable to construct the MTBF guarantee with a guaranteed
distribution of times to failure about the mean. Experience
to date has shown that the average equipment operating hours
in a RIW contract has been two to four times the predicted
or guaranteed MTBF, and this situation has essentially
eliminated this type of gaming.
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VI. ARN-XXX A CASE STUDY
By combining the ARINC developed criteria and DoD guid-
ance a reasonably composite set of guidelines can be struc-
tured for use by the program or acquisition manager for
testing the viability of RIW in a particular program. As an
example of the application of these guidelines the recent
experience in the Air Force ARN-XXX TACAN program will be
discussed. A complete summary of this program authorized by
Harold S. Balaban can be found in Proceedings 1975 Annual
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium .
The Air Force's desire to acquire a highly reliable
short-range navigation system to replace the obsolescent
tube-type designs developed in the 1950' s led to the 1971
feasibility study by two contractors (Collins Radio Company
and ITT Avionics Division). The outcome of the study was
the conclusion that a new system could be developed at or
below the Air Force price ceiling of $10,000 per set and
would meet the desired specifications. In mid-1972 a re-
quest for proposal (RFP) was issued which called for a solid-
state system meeting new FAA requirements for an increased
number of channels, having built-in test equipment (BITE)
and using a digital output. The maintenance concept to be
employed was discard at failure. The RFP further called for
the cost and MTBF values of the feasibility study which re-
presented a 2-to-l cost improvement over prior TACAN systems
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and a 10-to-l improvement in reliability. The test program
called for in-plant, system flight tests, prototype environ-
mental tests, maintainability demonstration to MIL-STD-471
,
and a reliability demonstration to MIL-STD-781 (Test Plan
III, Test level F, O = 1000 hours, 9 2 = 500 hours). The de-
sire to encourage competition throughout the acquisition
cycle led to the inclusion of a provision for set inter-
changeability through standardized mounting and pin designa-
tions.
Two alternative approaches for reliability and life cycle
cost control for the production contract were stated in the
RFP. The contractors were required to provide the following
parameters which were to be used in a life cycle cost equa-
tion: unit production price, MTBF, MTTR, training and docu-
mentation costs, and ratio of base and depot repair. After
a two year field monitoring program, a 10-year life cycle
cost target will then be established against which the con-
tractors will be measured to determine bonus/penalty amounts.
This first approach represented costs to be incurred by the
Air Force based on in-house support of the system.
The alternative approach required the contractor to pro-
vide a RIW for 48 months starting on 31 December of the year
in which the Air Force accepted delivery. It incorporated
an MTBF guarantee with reliability improvement milestones to
be met throughout the contract.
Five companies responded to the RFP, with Collins Radio
Corporation and General Dynamics Electronics being selected
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in April 1973 to compete in dual development for the produc-
tion award. Through the development phase constant contact
was maintained between government and contractor representa-
tives to ensure that fair and complete information was being
exchanged without compromising the integrity of the competi-
tion. The contractors are at present responding to the pro-
duction RFP which was developed with many of the contractors'
ideas incorporated.
The conformance of the ARN-XXX program to the RIW appli-
cation criteria proposed by ARINC and the guidance suggested
by DoD is represented in Figure 6.
The extent to which the two marginal cases will impact on
the warranty price is uncertain but an attempt was made in
the contract to reduce both government and contractor risk
in those areas. An operating hour adjustment provision
called for a contract price adjustment formula to be invoked
if the 68-hour-per-month standard was deviated from by more
than 5%. The marginal conformance with the R&M estimation
criterion was discounted because at the time of preparation
of the production proposals both contractors had performed
qualification, reliability/maintainability demonstration,
and some flight tests on prototypes. Also the designs em-
ployed standard types of functions all of which were in the
state-of-the-art
.
The experience gained from this and other recent procure-
ments where RIW may be applicable have resulted in at least
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clause. These policies constitute good management practices
in their own right and if consideration of a RIW in an acqui-
sition does nothing more than promote these functions then
there will be implied improvement in the acquisition process.
In the ARN-XXX program free interchange of ideas on war-
ranty was enhanced by holding separate meetings with the two
contractors about five months after the award of the develop-
ment contract. The Navy experience has been somewhat the
same with the shipboard electronics warfare suite developed
by the Naval Electronics Systems Command which was previously
mentioned. Continual interface with the contractors during
all stages of the acquisition concerning the provisions of
the warranty will ensure both complete understanding of its
significance and a realistic pricing of the warranty by the
contractor. Care must be exercised to control the exchange
of data between buyer and prospective seller to guard against
giving one contractor a competitive edge.
The second policy adopted to obtain the best possible
warranty was the promotion of data interchange between Serv-
ices where experience had been gained in warranty procure-
ment. This policy is relevant in all warranty situations to
discover the advances which have taken place in other agen-
cies and for one reason or another have gone unpublished.
The third general policy concerns the experiences of the
airlines in warranty contracting which, in the ARN-XXX pro-
gram, led to the inclusion of the MTBF guarantee provision.
Other experiences which could prove useful are the form,
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fit and function specifications that provide the basis for
airline avionics procurements. Relaxation of stringent
specifications and standards which in many cases are outdated
and unrealistic may allow procurement of commercial, off-
the-shelf items in many instances where otherwise a specifi-
cally designed and expensive piece of equipment would be
procured.
The final general policy could be termed Integrated
Logistic Support Management, and although this function is
the responsibility of each program/acquisition manager in
both government and commercial acquisition programs, it is
occasionally found to be lacking. In the case of the ARN-XXX
the Air Force found that it was able to uncover, discuss,
and prevent problems from occurring further downstream in
its program by talking with the users and the support activ-
ities early in the development stages of the acquisition.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the research effort in preparation for this
thesis two significant problem areas became evident. The
first area concerns the requirements determination process.
Additional emphasis on the subject of arbitrary reliability
requirements should be made in an attempt to make operation-
al requirements realistic in the light of existing and fore-
seeable technological capabilities.
The second area of concern which was voiced by industry
and military participants in warranty procurements concerns
the formation of a warranty evaluation center. The approach
taken to incorporate warranties into the acquisition of
major weapon systems and subsystems to date has been frag-
mented and generally uncoordinated. The establishment of an
evaluation center either within DoD or as a contracted sup-
port function would add greatly to the overall procurement
wisdom and could serve as a data collection activity, evalua-
tion facility, and point of assistance in formulating con-
tract warranty provisions.
As stated at the outset there exists an intrinsic goal
conflict in the buyer/seller relationship which heretofore
has remained unresolved by conventional contracting tech-
niques. The incorporation of Reliability Improvement War-
ranties in the acquisition of systems or equipments which
conform to the criteria presented will not only provide the
reliability desired by the operators but will establish for
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the buyer reasonable cost certainty for the initial deploy-
ment period of the system. The problem of retention of
personnel with technical skills required to perform mainte-
nance on complex equipments may require RIW support in the
future.
Caution, however, must be exercised in the decision to
invoke a RIW in the production contract. The long term re-
lationship established between the buyer and seller can be
an overwhelming liability instead of the valuable asset for
which it was intended. A greater degree of business manage-
ment sense must be exercised in evaluating the contractor's
long term capabilities to meet the contractual demands of
the RIW. It is not intended that RIW become the new "buzz-
word" in weapon system acquisition, for nothing could be
less conducive to a reasonable and considered application of
warranties. As in all firm-fixed price contracts the total
cost risk belongs to the seller, but the ultimate program
risk remains with the buyer, and in the DoD environment the




ASPR 1-324. 3(b) In deciding whether to use a warranty
clause, at least the following factors shall be considered:
(i) nature of the item and its end use;
(ii) cost of the warranty and degree of price competi-
tion as it may affect this cost;
(iii) criticality of meeting specifications;
(iv) damages to the Government that might be expected
to arise in the event of defective performance;
(v) cost of correction or replacement, either by the
contractor or another source, in the absence of
a warranty;
(vi) administration cost and difficulty of enforcing
the warranty;
(vii) ability to take advantage of the warranty, as
conditioned by storage, time, distance of the
using agency from the source, or other factors;
(viii) operation of the warranty as a deterrent against
deficiencies
;
(ix) the extent to which Government acceptance is to
be based upon contractor inspection or quality
control
;
(x) whether because of the nature of the items the
Government inspection system would not be likely
to provide adequate protection without a warran-
ty;
(xi) whether the contractor's present quality program
is reliable enough to provide adequate protec-
tion without a warranty, or, if not, whether a
warranty would cause the contractor to institute
an effective and reliable quality program;
(xii) reliance on "brand name" integrity;
(xiii) whether a warranty is regularly given for a com-
mercial component of a more complex end item;
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(xiv) criticality of item for protection of personnel
or property, e.g., for safety in flight;
(xv) the stage of development of the item and the
state of the art; and
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